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Abstract. Computer-based control systems have grown in size, complexity, 
distribution and criticality. In this paper a methodology is presented to perform 
an “abstract testing” of such large control systems in an efficient way: an 
abstract test is specified directly from system functional requirements and has 
to be instantiated in more test runs to cover a specific configuration, comprising 
any number of control entities (sensors, actuators and logic processes). Such a 
process is usually performed by hand for each installation of the control system, 
requiring a considerable time effort and being an error prone verification 
activity. To automate a safe passage from abstract tests, related to the so called 
generic software application, to any specific installation, an algorithm is 
provided, starting from a reference architecture and a state-based behavioural 
model of the control software. The presented approach has been applied to a 
railway interlocking system, demonstrating its feasibility and effectiveness in 
several years of testing experience. 
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1.  Introduction 
Computer-based systems used for industrial control applications feature a high 
number of requirements that make them complex, heterogeneous and highly 
distributed. When they are also required to be large and safety-critical, system testing, 
requiring extensive code and configuration coverage, becomes a difficult and time 
consuming process, which would be almost infeasible without advanced test 
specification and execution methodologies and tools.  
This paper addresses some important issues related to abstract testing of large 
mission/safety critical control systems. Abstract testing can be defined as a 
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configuration independent and auto-instantiating approach to system testing of large 
computer-based control installations. In other words, it consists in having an abstract 
test specification, written without referring to any specific system installation, and a 
mechanism to automatically detect the specific configuration of the control system 
and instantiate accordingly the abstract test-suite into test-cases to be physically 
executed on the system under verification. The configuration data depends on the type 
and number of devices to be used, which in turn is usually installation specific, while 
the control algorithm is configuration independent in most cases1. This means that 
control actions performed by the actuators depend on device classes and subsets 
related to the specific installation and on their interrelationships; however, such 
dependency does not impact on the generality of system functional requirements and 
of the corresponding test specification. A large class of complex computer-based 
control systems are also configuration-critical, that is to say they need a thorough 
(static and/or dynamic) verification of their configuration database. While a static 
verification can be performed “off-line” (by hand or by means of specific tools), a 
dynamic verification requires the execution of tests on the target system. In order to 
achieve a dynamic coverage of the configuration data, more executions of the same 
abstract test are needed, with the aim of involving more control entities (theoretically, 
all the combinations should be tested). This time consuming activity can be automated 
by using the abstract testing approach presented in this paper. 
 
(a)     (b) 
Figure 1. A control system (a) and the integration of control software (b). 
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Figure 2. System-level functional V&V activities and paper contribution (shaded box). 
                                                
1 This assumption holds well for mature domains, where designs can be reused and configured 
to many different installations; however, the approach may be more difficult to apply to new 
application areas, which still need to be completely understood in terms of abstract 
requirements of system logic. 
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Figure 1a gives an at a glance general representation of a control system, featuring 
sensor and actuator subsystems in order to interact with the external environment, 
while Figure 1b shows the necessary integration between generic control software and 
specific configuration data, which is the central topic of this paper. 
Figure 2 reports a general scheme of system V&V activities for safety-critical system 
installations, with the numbers indicating the usual temporal sequence of activities 
(steps 3’ and 3’’ are absent in traditional approaches). The shaded box in the central 
part of the figure indicate the target of this paper. The two boxes with the thick border 
represent two recurrent activities, as they must be repeated for each system 
installation, for which automation is particularly advantageous. Figure 2 also shows 
that a structural model (step 3’), derived from a reference architecture (step 3”), is 
needed to achieve automation; this is also a novel achievement, which will be 
discussed in detail in section §3. 
The approach presented in this paper is based on assumptions which define a 
reference software architecture of the control system. The approach is then applicable 
whenever the system under test fits or can be refactored/engineered to fit such an 
architecture. Another important aspect is related to the reference behavioural model, 
representing system functional specification by means of a Finite State Machine 
(FSM): the approach can be applied whenever the dynamic of the control system 
(possibly featuring an unlimited state space) can be abstracted as a FSM. This is true 
for most computer-based control systems based on a sequential computation, 
belonging to the Discrete Event (Dynamic) System (DES or DEDS) category (a large 
amount of literature is available on this subject, as reported in Section §2).  
The abstract testing methodology described in this paper has been applied to a railway 
interlocking (IXL) system, used for train route and ground signalling management. A 
traditional approach for the system verification of a railway IXL consists in the 
following steps: 
• Functional testing of the control software and measurement of code 
coverage; 
• Static verification of the configuration data, using proper support tools; 
• Acceptance testing, regarding the verification of the most significant railway 
logic conditions. 
While quite effective, such an approach does not guarantee dynamic configuration 
coverage. In other words, control software is tested dynamically over a little part of a 
specific configuration, until code coverage is considered satisfactory, but there is no 
evidence that the integration of generic control algorithms and configuration data is 
correct for the specific installation. A dynamic black-box testing of the specific 
installation, ensuring both code and configuration coverage, represents the safest 
approach, considering that installations can be very different one from each other, 
thus possibly stimulating the control software with untested combinations of inputs. 
The approach presented in this paper perfectly suited such a real-world industrial 
Automatic instantiation of abstract tests on specific configurations for large critical control systems      4 
case-study, allowing test engineers to rapidly verify large installations, achieving the 
required coverage for both control code and configuration data2.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets the contribution of 
this paper in the context of related works; Section 3 presents the abstract testing 
methodology, describing the a reference structural model of computer-based control 
systems and the working principles of the abstract testing algorithm; Section 4 
introduces the main characteristics of a railway interlocking system and describes the 
application of abstract testing to such a case-study; finally, Section 5 summarizes 
results and gives some hints about future developments and applications. 
2.  Related works 
Abstract testing belongs to the category of model-based testing approaches [3]. In 
model-based testing, test-cases are derived in whole or in part from a model that 
describes some (usually functional) aspects of the system under test. While many 
research works address the problem of the automatic generation of the abstract test-
suite starting from a system’s (formal) model (see reference [7]), very few deal with 
the problem of the automatic instantiation of abstract test-suites. For instance, 
reference [8] addresses the problem of executing abstract tests on distributed 
software. 
Reference models are usually based on notations of the Unified Modelling Language 
(UML) [9]. UML is a de facto standard in software development (see Model Driven 
Engineering, [10]), but it can be also used for different purposes, like formal 
verification [11] and reverse engineering [12]. There exist several research works 
which deal with the automatic test generation from UML models [13]. The Finite 
State Machine (FSM) formalism, available in an “extended” version amongst UML 
diagrams as the State Diagrams (or Statechart) view, has also been widely used as a 
fundamental behavioural representation for test-generation, both informally [6] and 
formally [14]. A fundamental paper on model-based testing [22] underlines the key 
concerns in adopting FSM based methods. 
Railway control systems are the ideal candidate for the application of the 
methodology described in this paper, featuring large, distributed, heterogeneous 
architectures and varying configurations according to any specific installation. The 
verification of railway control systems (like the ones compliant to the new 
ERTMS/ETCS standard [26]) have been studied in a number of research works, using 
either simulation based [27] or formal approaches [24]. As for any safety-critical 
system, the verification and validation of critical railway control systems must respect 
international safety standards, like the CENELEC norms [1]. These norms prescribe a 
number of thorough V&V activities, including hazard-analysis [28]. The distinction 
between generic and specific software applications shown in Figure 1b is also 
                                                
2 A widespread and effective code coverage measure consists in Decision Coverage (or one of 
its variants, like Decision to Decision Path, DDP) [2], while for the configuration the 
coverage measure refers to the access to the entries of the configuration database. 
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provided by the CENELEC standard. However, standards prescribe just general 
requirements and guidelines, but they do not address the solution of specific 
verification issues, which is under the responsibility of each supplier. From the point 
of view of the CENELEC standard, this paper covers the methodological aspects 
related to the verification of the “Specific Application”. 
3. The abstract testing methodology 
This section describes the abstract testing methodology, starting from a reference 
architectural model and then presenting the algorithm used to automate the 
instantiation of functional tests on specific configurations. 
3.1 Basic definitions 
Definition 1. A Control Logic is defined as the set of software components which 
implement system functional requirements in order to realize a given control 
algorithm. 
Definition 2. A State of the system under test is defined as the set of values which are 
assigned to all its internal state variables. A reduced representation of system state 
consists in considering only the variables of interest for the Control Logic. 
Definition 3. An Abstract Test is a non executable test-case in which the reference to 
the involved control entities is symbolic and possibly related to equivalence classes. 
Definition 4. An Input Sequence is a temporal sequence of stimuli provided to system 
input gates, including sensing devices and human-machine interfaces. 
Definition 5. An Output is the set of data or control actions which are produced by 
the system at its output interfaces / actuators in response to a certain Input Sequence. 
3.2 Reference architectural model 
A control system always features: 
• a Sensor system, constituted by a variable number of possibly heterogeneous 
sensors, used to detect inputs from the environment; 
• an Actuator system, used to implement the control actions decided by system 
logic; 
• a Control system, which collects inputs and elaborates system outputs 
according to the desired control function and acting on the actuator 
subsystem. 
These main subsystems and their interrelationships are depicted in the white boxes of 
Figure 3, according to the notation of UML Class Diagrams. 
In this paper it is assumed that computer-based control systems (also known as Real-
Time systems) implement the control function by means of discrete control logic, 
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written in a suitable programming language, and a configuration database which is 
used to map the control logic on a specific installation. 
The configuration independent entities of the control software constitute the so called 
“Generic Application” and are shown in light grey in the class diagram of Figure 3; 
the implementation specific ones are shown in dark grey, and constitute the “Specific 
Application”.  
Processes shown in Figure 3 should be meant as software entities managing specific 
data and functions, while satisfying to a certain extent the object-oriented design 
paradigm (e.g. data encapsulation). Widespread best-practices in real-time software 
engineering employ design approaches based on modularity and abstraction, which 
emulate object-orientation even using non object-oriented (i.e. legacy or proprietary) 
programming languages [24]. In such a view, processes are associated to physical or 
logical entities. All processes feature a data structure and operations, and can be 
scheduled as independent tasks by a real-time operating system, i.e. at each 
elaboration cycle: 
• Sensor Processes collect and manage data easured by sensors; 
• Logic Processes cooperate in order to implement the desired control function 
by accessing the status of Sensor Processes and issuing commands to 
Actuator Processes; 
• Actuator Processes verify commands’ actability and possibly implement 
them by driving actuators. 
Definition 6. A Logic Process is defined as an entity of the control software with a 
well defined role and structure but without a direct correspondence with a physical 
entity (i.e. a sensor or an actuator). 
In a typical centralized control system, the number of logic processes is usually less 
than the number of physical objects, but their complexity is usually higher, as they 
implement the core of the control algorithm. 
Despite its specific representation mechanism, the configuration database must 
provide the instantiation of objects for Sensor and Actuator classes of Figure 3 and 
their interrelationships with logical entities. This is achieved by defining: 
• The physical entities used in the specific installation, by means of Sensor and 
Actuator Lists; 
• The relationships (type, cardinality, etc.) between Sensor/Actuator Processes 
and Logic Processes, using proper Association Lists. 
For coherence of representation, the aforementioned lists are shown as objects in the 
class diagram of Figure 3, but obviously they can be represented differently when 
using a non object-oriented database (e.g. by tables in a relational database). 
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As already mentioned, the approach presented in this paper is applicable if the 
software architecture of the system under verification is compliant to the reference 
model presented above. If the software of the control system has not been yet 
developed, then the “design for verifiability” philosophy would suggest to make it 
compliant to the reference architecture for abstract testing. This requires adopting an 
object-oriented or analogously structured design approach, in which physical and 
logical entities are mapped on corresponding processes, each one featuring its own 
attributes and operations. For existing systems which are not compliant to the 
reference architectural model, it would be necessary to review the design to determine 
whether it can be re-factored or re-engineered [12]. Although this may involve a good 
deal of effort, if many configurations are likely then the effort is more than offset by 
the savings achieved by the multiple application of the abstract testing method. 
3.3 Abstract testing 
Before introducing the abstract testing methodology, some introductory statements 
are necessary. In this paper, abstract testing is not meant as a functional test 
specification methodology. Instead, abstract testing allows test engineers to specify 
configuration independent tests, to automatically instantiate and execute the abstract 
test-suite on any specific configuration. This allows test engineers to achieve the goal 
of an extensive coverage of both control code and configuration data in order to verify 
their correct integration. Abstract testing can not discover configuration errors which 
do not lead to incorrect system outputs when combined with control code. In fact, the 
configuration of the system is regarded as an input of the transformation algorithm 
from abstract to specific tests. Therefore, abstract testing can not detect whether a 
system is properly configured or not for the specific installation (such verification 
should be performed separately, and is not in the scope of this work). 
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Figure 3. Reference architecture for the computer-based control system. 
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The output of the needed abstract testing algorithm is a set of test-cases to be 
physically executed on the system under test, depending on its specific configuration. 
In other words: 
Tests Physicalion)Configurat Set,-Test(Abstract Algorithmion Tranformat  →  
Expression 1 
Expression 1 means that the algorithm transforms a couple, constituted by an abstract 
test specification and a specific configuration, into a set of “physical” tests which can 
be directly executed on the target system (or any simulated version of it [31]). 
The cardinality of the transformation is in general “one to many”: at least one 
physical test must be executed for each abstract test, but more of them could be 
necessary. Nevertheless, a degenerate although possible case consists in a 
configuration which does not allow executing any physical test for a specified abstract 
test. 
Abstract test specifications are derived from the system functional requirements and 
are couched in a precise formalism to avoid interpretational ambiguity by the 
automated algorithm. Functional requirements for the systems of interest are usually 
specified in natural language, and generally conform to the following template: 
“When system is in state SI and receives an input I from sensors SEN, then it 
shall actuate output O using actuators ACT and transit in state SO” 
where S, I, O, SEN, and ACT are respectively lists, vectors or equivalence classes 
(determined by particular properties) of states, inputs, outputs, sensors and actuators. 
Please note that the sensor class SEN is not restricted to be related to the physical 
sensors of the control system, but can represent any measurement or human 
interaction device of system interface with the environment (an analogous 
consideration holds for ACT). In such a way, timing requirements can be managed in 
the same way of any other requirements. In fact, time can be considered as a variable 
of interest (whenever required) and mapped both on input conditions to be generated 
and outputs to be verified. Herein after, with no loss of generality, it will be assumed 
to be dealing with generic “properties”, used to select objects of any class (i.e. S, I, O, 
SEN, ACT) within requirements, coherently with an abstract specification which 
should identify entities only according to their properties of interest (i.e. attributes’ 
range of values and relationships with other entities). Usually, informal specification 
only indicates changes in outputs or output states, assuming the rest remains the same; 
obviously, this does not influence the generality of the proposed form. 
Therefore, a general format for abstract test description (or Test-Case, TC), 
formalizing the functional requirement, could be the following: 
(STATEI , INPUT) → (OUTPUT, STATEO) 
Expression 2 
That it to say, a couple constituted by an output and output state is associated (thus the 
arrow) to any significant input and input state, as stated by system specification. 
STATEI and STATEO represent respectively input and output states. INPUT includes 
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both input values and the involved sensors3; similarly, OUTPUT also refers to both 
actuators and output values. Therefore INPUT = {I, SEN} and OUTPUT = {O, 
ACT}. Each macro variable in the left part of Expression 2 is a combination of 
elementary variables, namely “influence variables” [5] (e.g. STATEI = (StateI1, 
StateI2, …)), which satisfy a given condition (e.g. SI) and have to be instantiated 
according to such condition in order to generate an executable test-case (e.g. StateI1 = 
sI1, StateI2 = sI2, …). Dealing with critical systems, it is assumed to consider any 
combination of inputs respecting SI and I, despite of possible redundancies which 
could be eliminated by defining proper (i.e. safe) reduction criteria to be applied on 
the test-set [5]. The macro variables on the right of Expression 2, instead, must be 
checked after test execution in order to verify that their instances satisfy the O and SO 
conditions. Note that in general STATEI ≠ STATEO (intended as sets), that is the state 
variables to be checked do not have to be the same defined in input state. This leaves 
test engineers free to define different subsets of interest on input and output states, 
thus implicitly defining equivalence classes. Finally, note that according to the 
general structure presented in previous section, system state is exhaustively given by 
defining the value of all attributes of all its Processes. Of course, such a generalization 
comprises the simplest cases, in which e.g. the requirement (and thus the test) 
specifies single input and output instances. 
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Figure 4. A high level flow-chart of the abstract testing algorithm. 
                                                
3 Please note the distinction between the physical sensor input (e.g. temperature) and its logical 
representation (e.g. numerical value). For testing purposes, the control system is often used in 
simulation environments which are able to inject logical values directly into the system 
instead of creating real environmental conditions (an obviously more difficult task). 
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The first two variables, namely STATEI and INPUT can be collapsed into a single 
variable, namely INPUT_SEQUENCE. Introducing INPUT_SEQUENCE allows 
considering the system combinatorial from an input point of view: starting from a 
well-know INITIAL_STATE of the system, e.g. the one following system boot-strap 
or initialization, an INPUT_SEQUENCE uniquely determines STATEI (and possibly 
also INPUT) for a given test, passing through a number of intermediate system states. 
This is important, as system functional tests should be always executed starting from 
a well-known reference system state (typically an “idle” state), and performing all the 
actions necessary to reach the state of interest (this sequence of steps is often 
indicated as the “preamble”). Then, system is stimulated with required input, and 
finally output and output state are checked for correctness with respect to the expected 
ones (the process is usually automated in simulation environments providing scripting 
capabilities). 
The construction of the preamble requires little effort, indeed, as it can be easily 
obtained by properly assembling test sequences. In fact, with the exception of the 
initial reference state, the input state of a test-case (say TCX) is the output state of at 
least another test-case (say TCY); formally: STATEI-X = STATEO-Y. Of course, the 
sequence of definition of the test-cases can be advantageously arranged in an order 
such that: 
)STATESTATE()(|)(TC  )(TC Y-OX-IYX =∧<∃∀ tttt  
Expression 3 
In Expression 3, TC (t) represents the test-case defined at time t. In this way, the 
needed preamble is always obtainable by a backward iteration (stopping at the initial 
state) which selects the sequence of test-case needed to get to the state of interest. 
This aspect, which can be easily automated, has not been explicated in the algorithm 
presented in this section, as it represents only a collateral feature. 
On the basis of such assumptions, a transformation algorithm for abstract testing can 
be introduced, with the aim of being (at least partially) automated4. The algorithm is 
provided in two different forms: a classic flow-chart (see Figure 4), which is at a 
higher abstraction level, less formal but more readable; a more detailed meta-
language program (see Figure 5), which uses a sort of (C and SQL)-like pseudo 
language, featuring a quite self-explaining syntax (variables are shown in Italic font to 
distinguish them from keywords). 
The following further assumptions are necessary in order to simplify the algorithm in 
its detailed form, without loosing its generality: 
- Test-cases are ordered by their input states, so that for any new test-case processed 
by the algorithm it is possible to find a previously executed (and not failed) test-
case whose output state consists of the input one of the new test to be executed: in 
such a way, the input sequence can be determined backward in a very 
                                                
4 Variants of the algorithm are certainly possible, but they should not differ substantially from 
the one proposed in this paper. 
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straightforward manner (the corresponding procedure is omitted in the algorithm 
for the sake of brevity); 
- The complete system state is given by the value assigned to all attributes of all its 
objects (i.e. s1=attribute1, s2=attribute2, etc.): in such a way, the output state is 
checked by identifying state variables by the name of the corresponding attributes 
(assuming them as unique identifiers). 
The detailed algorithm written in meta-language is reported in Figure 5. Numbered 
comments have been added for any significant block of statements (they will be 
referred to as “steps”), in order to facilitate the understanding of the algorithm. The 
variables used in the algorithm and their meaning are listed in Table 1 (ordered as 
they are met in the code).  
 
 
Figure 5. The abstract testing algorithm. 
1 /* 0. Scan all abstract test-cases 
2 for each TC 
3   /* 1. Cycle through all input states of the equivalence class 
4   select I_States from Input_States satisfying Si 
5   for each STATEi in I_States 
6     execute Input_Sequence reaching STATEi 
7     /* 2. Select all sensors involved in the test 
8     select Input_Sensors from Sensor_List satisfying INPUT->SEN 
9     /* 3. Cycle through all sensors to assign their input values 
10     for each Sensor in Input_Sensors 
11       /* 4. Each sensor is stimulated with an input of the equiv. class 
12       select Input_TC from Input satisfying INPUT->I 
13       for each INPUTj in Input_TC 
14         stimulate Sensor with INPUTj 
15       endfor 
16       /* When all sensors have been stimulated with proper inputs 
17       /* the corresponding output and output state are checked  
18       /* 5. Select all actuators involved in the test 
19       select Output_Actuators from Actuator_List satisfying OUTPUT->ACT 
20       /* 6. Verify that each actuator satisfies its output condition 
21       for each Actuator in Output_Actuators 
22         check Actuator for condition O 
23         if check failed then notify failure 
24       endfor 
25       /* 7. Select the subset of system state to be checked 
26       select all Attributes from STATEo 
27       /* 8. Verify that the value of each attribute of control 
28       /*    processes satisfies output state condition 
29       for each Attrib in Attributes 
30         /* 9. Scan through attributes of all processes using association 
31         /*    lists to detect the attributes of interest 
32         for each Sensor in Input_Sensors 
33          select S_Attrib of Sensor where S_Attrib->name=Attrib 
34          select Sen_LP in Sensor_Association_List including Attrib 
35         endfor 
36         for each Actuator in Output_Actuators 
37          select A_Attrib of Actuator where A_Attrib->name=Attrib 
38          select Act_LP in Actuator_Association_List including Attrib 
39         endfor 
40  /* 10. Merges selected logic processes in a single list 
41         merge Sen_LP and Act_LP to Logic_Processes 
42        /* 11. Select attributes of logic processes by their name 
43        for each Logic_Process in Logic_Processes 
44    select LP_Attrib of Logic_Process where LP_Attrib->name=Attrib 
45        endfor 
46        /* 12. Merges all selected attributes in a single list 
47        merge S_Attrib, A_Attrib, LP_Attrib to Proc_Attrib 
48        /* 13. Checks all selected attributes to verify output state 
49        check all Proc_Attrib for condition So 
50        if check failed then notify failure 
51      endfor 
52   endfor 
53 endfor 
54 /* 14. If no fail is notified, test can be considered as “passed”       
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As already mentioned, properties (e.g. I) are generally used in order to extract objects 
from a given set (e.g. input domain), using proper queries, whose implementation is 
application specific, depending on the particular representation of the configuration 
database. The involved Lists are the ones represented in Class Diagram of Figure 3 
and already described in previous section. The variables of the algorithm which have 
not been already defined correspond to lists of objects (or records) obtained by a 
query (e.g. SELECT Input_Sensors …) on the configuration database, using the input 
conditions defined by the abstract test. 
The cycle numbered as 1 selects a state of the equivalence class defined in the abstract 
test-case and executes the proper input sequence needed to make the system transit in 
that state. In such a case, the SELECT query is implicit in the statement, as no system 
database access is necessary (as aforementioned, each of the input states is generated 
by extensive combination of elementary states variables defined by test engineers). 
All following instruction blocks behave in a similar way: they first select a subset of 
interest of a certain domain by performing a query based on a specified property, and 
then execute a cycle on the extracted subset. 
As aforementioned, in general SEN, ACT, I, O and S could be either lists themselves, 
and in this case they will contain the identifiers of the entities to be involved (e.g. 
SEN = {SEN1, SEN2, …}), or properties to be respected by one or more attributes 
(e.g. SENSOR_TYPE), identifying a class of entities (e.g. SENSOR_TYPE = 
Temperature_Sensor OR Light_Sensor): both options can be collapsed into the same 
case of a property based selection, with no loss of generality. In order to get a test 
specification which is configuration independent, when the selection regards system 
entities the explicit form should not be used. 
Looking at the algorithm, it is evident that for each produced test-case a sensor can be 
stimulated by a single input at each input state, so there are no input sequences 
possible at the test-case level (they are only possible at a higher “scenario level”). 
Such aspect is coherent with the state machine assumption: since the first input can 
possibly trigger a state transition, following inputs must correspond to different test-
cases. 
The core of the algorithm consists is located in its second half (steps from 7 to 14), 
where the output state is checked for correctness. When system is configured on a 
certain installation, its hardware structure is well known in terms of needed sensors 
and actuators, while the type and number of logic processes are not directly known. 
The reason is that logic processes are automatically instantiated according to the 
hardware configuration, as defined in sensor, actuator and association lists. Therefore, 
the algorithm is such to access system internal state by scanning the attributes of all 
control processes, starting form sensor and actuator lists and accessing related logic 
processes by means of the association lists. In fact, these lists are meant to link system 
hardware to its software components, both of which are variable from installation to 
installation. The approach allows moving from external entities (i.e. system interface 
with the environment) to its control logic (i.e. software processes) by using 
configuration information. The search process is based on the assumption that the 
state variables to be checked have the same names of the corresponding attributes. In 
fact, although object-based programming should avoid attribute duplication, the same 
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state variable can be stored in more homonymous attributes of different classes. A 
different design option consists in copying at each elaboration cycle the content of 
attributes constituting the data structure of all objects into a single database: this 
option is highly advantageous as it avoids attribute duplication (any attribute is a 
primary key in the database) and simplifies the search process for output state 
checking (a simple query for each state variable is necessary). 
As for algorithm execution, there are two possibilities, which are perfectly equivalent 
for the purpose of the algorithm: 
1) the algorithm for abstract testing is interpreted in real-time, and then statements 
like “stimulate Sensor with Input” are physically executed on the system under test as 
the algorithm executes; 
2) the algorithm does not directly execute statements, but writes them using a proper 
syntax on a set of script files to be later executed in an automated testing 
environment. 
One important aspect of the algorithm is that, besides generating test-cases, it also 
checks output for correctness in an automated way. If the state of the system under 
verification is not accessible by test engineers, then the part of the algorithm meant to 
verify output state (steps 7-13) is not applicable. Furthermore, if an automated 
checking of actuators’ output is not possible, steps 5 and 6 are not applicable, and the 
algorithm only serves as a test-case generator. 
4.  The computer-based railway interlocking case-study 
This section describes the application of the abstract testing methodology presented in 
the previous section to computer-based railway interlocking systems. 
4.1 Computer-based railway interlocking systems 
A railway interlocking system (IXL) is a safety-critical distributed system used to 
manage train routes and related signals in a station or line section (which is divided 
into “blocks”). Its development and verification process must respect international 
safety norms [1]. Modern IXL systems are computer-based and feature a high number 
of functional requirements, thus making them very complex. The verification and 
validation (V&V) process of such systems comprises a set of time-consuming 
activities (hazard-analysis, code inspection, structural testing, etc.), among which 
functional testing is one of the most important, in terms of both budget and criticality 
[29]. Moreover, IXL installations are different from each other. Therefore, V&V 
consists first in verifying the generic software application, and then the specific one. 
However, while an abstract test-suite can be developed on the basis of the Generic 
Application (and hence of system functional specification), in order to verify the 
specific application the former test-suite must be instantiated according to the 
configuration of the installation under test. Clearly, this need perfectly fits the purpose 
of the abstract testing approach presented in this paper. Traditionally, such an activity 
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is performed by hand, with evident disadvantages in terms of required effort and 
correctness of results. 
A computer-based IXL is composed of the following entities: 
- a safety-critical centralized elaboration unit (indicated with CPU), which is meant to 
run the control software (processes and configuration); 
- a Man Machine Interface (MMI), consisting of a display and a functional keyboard 
which allows the setting and control of train routes; 
- a Communication Computer (CC), used to manage the communication via a Wide 
Area Network (WAN) with a (distant) central Automation System (AS), also 
providing remote route management, and possibly adjacent IXL; 
- a set of Track Circuits (TC5), used to detect if a train is occupying the route; 
- a set of Switch Points (SP), used to form train route; 
- a set of Light Signals (LS), used to notify to train drivers route status. 
The IXL configuration associates each possible route to its related physical control 
entities: TC, SP and LS. 
A slightly simplified architecture of an IXL is reported in Figure 6a. 
An IXL is basically used to manage route formation commands coming from a local 
human operator (using the MMI) or a remote operator (using the AS). When a 
command is received, the CPU controls its actability by checking the status of all 
involved entities, either physical (TC, SP and LS) or logical (e.g. block orientation, 
line out of service, station emergency, etc.). If the route formation command can be 
safely carried out, then Switch Points are moved accordingly. A route can also be 
formed in a degraded mode, in which route integrity can not be assured because a 
check failed on a Track Circuit due to its being occupied, or because a Switch Point is 
not operational. These degradations reflect on route integrity status, which have to be 
properly notified by multi-aspect Light Signals. Moreover, the system has also to 
manage the change of route status when a train passes on it, until the liberation of the 
route. The state machine associated to a route is quite complex: for the sake of 
simplicity, it will not be described in detail. 
First of all, it is important to distinguish between sensor and actuator entities in an 
IXL. Clearly, Track Circuits can be considered as Sensors, as they are only used to 
detect train position. Switch Points and Light Signals are instead Actuators, because 
they are responsible for system control actions. The interface for route setting and 
monitoring, finally, can be considered both as a Sensor, as it receives commands, and 
an Actuator, as it displays outputs; analogously for the WAN interface. Another 
option, which is equivalent in theory but could be advantageous in practice, is to 
consider the effects of MMI and WAN interfaces directly on system state: intuitively, 
                                                
5 The TC acronym has been formerly used for “Test-Case”. In this section it only means “Track 
Circuit”. 
Automatic instantiation of abstract tests on specific configurations for large critical control systems      15 
moving an input variable into a state variable is always possible and does not 
necessarily impact on test accuracy. 
Now, a possible IXL software architecture can be defined, using an object oriented 
design, which will be used as a reference for the abstract testing application. Control 
processes will be associated to each physical control entity (TC, SP, LS), thus 
obtaining: 
- TC_Process, dealing with Track Circuit status (clear, occupied, broken, etc.); 
- SP_Process, managing Swich Point status (straight, reverse, moving, out of 
control, etc.) and operations (move_straight, move_reverse, etc.); 
- LS_Process, aimed at controlling Light Signals’ status (green, red, yellow, 
flashing yellow, etc.) 
Furthermore, logic processes have to be defined for each logical control entity, thus 
obtaining: 
- Route_Process, managing route status and control actions; 
- Line_Process, managing out of service conditions, temporary speed 
restrictions, etc.; 
- Block_Process, managing logical block orientation; 
- LeftIXL_Process (managing data received by left adjacent IXL) 
- etc. 
Also Sensor type processes, if implemented according to object orientation, shall 
feature the operations needed to access the status of their attributes. 
An IXL will then feature a real-time kernel scheduling the above mentioned 
processes. In case of the ASF Interlocking system, there exists a Logic Manager used 
to interpret and schedule processes written in an application specific logic language 
(see reference [24] for a brief description of its syntax), which allows for a sort of 
object orientation, even though not being specifically object oriented (see Figure 6b). 
Moreover, a separate and well defined system configuration will allow customizing of 
the IXL to each specific installation (e.g. Manchester railway station). In ASF 
implementation, the configuration database is of a relational type, featuring tables 
containing “lists of entities” and “lists of linked entities”, expressing the 
interrelationships between logic and physical control processes. Such lists are used to 
perform queries in order to determine the associations needed for the system to work 
and which abstract testing is based on (they basically correspond to 
Sensor/Actuator_Association_Lists referred to in Figure 3). Finally, the output state 
of the CPU is copied in a “state of entities” database at each elaboration cycle, with 
attributes being primary keys, thus significantly simplifying output state checking, as 
explained in previous section. 
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(a) 
 
 (b) 
Figure 6. An IXL scheme (a) and related control software architecture (b). 
 
4.2 Application of the abstract testing methodology 
In the previous section, the generic architecture of an IXL and how it can be mapped 
on the general scheme of Figure 3 have been shown. This mapping being possible, the 
application of the algorithm in its general form to the IXL case-study is quite 
straightforward. In order to understand how the algorithm applies to a specific 
abstract test-case, the following requirement can be considered:  
“When the IXL receives a route formation command, it has to check the 
following conditions: 
All TC associated to the route must be clean 
All SP associated to the route must be controlled 
The LS associated to the route must be controlled 
If such conditions are fulfilled, then SPs have to be moved accordingly, route 
LS shall be set to GREEN and Route Status has to be set to Set_OK”
6
. 
The requirement can be tested using the following abstract test-case (r represents a 
generic route): 
- Input State: 
Route r TC Status = Clean 
Route r SP Status = Controlled 
                                                
6 In a real IXL, the correct execution of a switch movement command must be verified before 
setting the signal to GREEN (in other words, SPs feature additional sensors). 
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Route r LS Status = Controlled 
- Input: 
MMI Input: Route r Formation Command 
- Output: 
 Route r SP Output = Positioned according to r 
 Route r LS Output = GREEN 
- Output State: 
 Route r Status = Set_OK 
For such an abstract test-case, the algorithm: 
- Step 1: Selects all input states fulfilling the Si condition specified in the test-
case. In other words, all combinations of TC, SP and LS statuses associated to 
each configured route have to be set to the specified values; for the specific test-
case, there exists exactly one combination of such values for each possible route, 
corresponding to a nominal system state (e.g. the idle state following system 
start-up); 
- Steps 2-4: Stimulates the IXL via the (simulated) MMI with the specific route 
formation command; as only one command is possible for each route, the SEN 
and I conditions will select exactly one sensor and one input for each input state; 
- Steps 5-6:  
Checks that all SP are positioned according to the specific route; the actuator 
selection routine applies to switch points of the specific route: condition ACT 
will read as follows “Actuators SP whose Routes attribute contains r” (SP 
are associated to more than one route); condition O will be “Positioned 
according to r”; 
Checks that the specific route status is set to GREEN: the check for LS 
output is analogous to the one described for SP (see point 0 above); 
- Steps 7-13: Checks that output status satisfy the So condition, that is “Route r 
Status = Set_OK”. As attributes are not duplicated into different objects and a 
“state of entity” dynamic database is available, such a check consists of a simple 
database access, verifying that “Route_Status_r” (primary key) is set to the value 
“Set_OK”. 
Clearly, the algorithm will produce as many physical tests as the number of possible 
routes which are configured in the IXL. The example is straightforward, 
corresponding to a nominal test. A possible negative test, related to the previous one, 
can be generated from the following requirement: 
“[…] If any of the conditions listed above is not fulfilled, then route 
command must not be accepted”. 
Automatic instantiation of abstract tests on specific configurations for large critical control systems      18 
In such a case and without adopting any reduction criterion on Si, there would be a 
significant increase in the number of generated physical tests. In fact, for each route 
the combinations of input states impeding the correct formation of the route are 
numerous, and all of them should be tested.  
4.3 Results 
The application of the abstract testing algorithm serves to automate two important 
steps in the traditional verification of railway IXL systems: 
1. the instantiation of the abstract test-set to a specific installation, in order to 
make it executable (Generic Application verification stage); 
2. the coverage of the so called (railway) “condition table”, reporting the 
expected outputs against all the significant railway conditions that can 
happen on all possible routes7 (Specific Application verification stage). 
The activity of point (1) usually requires hundreds of person-hours if executed by 
hand; if automated by means of the proposed abstract testing algorithm, effortless and 
safe results can be obtained in a few minutes (typically). The very first execution of 
the test-suite is aimed at checking system control logics, sometimes using a “draft” 
configuration database. In this case, the target of the coverage measure is the control 
code. When all the V&V activities of the “Generic Application” are considered 
satisfactory, the related Safety-Case is issued. 
Point (2) involves all the activities aimed at verifying the configuration database of 
the final installation. The abstract testing algorithm is able to cover all possible 
conditions on all possible routes. The testing against the condition table has sense, as 
it cannot be guaranteed a priori that a system output in response to a condition which 
is valid for one route continues to be valid for a different route. As an example, the 
decision coverage of the control code would not change by testing conditions on 
“symmetrical” routes (i.e. different routes which are identical in terms of their 
physical structure, type of involved entities and railway logic rules), as the code 
would be exercised in the same way. However, the involved configuration data does 
change, and its incorrectness or misinterpretation could alter the expected result. The 
verification against configuration incorrectness is usually performed by means of a 
static analysis, possibly executed by diversity-based approaches, that is to say in a 
redundant way, by means of different teams using independently developed tools. 
However, the dynamic use of the configuration database can not be verified in such 
way because it involves the interaction (or “integration”) between the control code 
and the configuration data. Such important task is automated by the algorithm 
provided in this paper, such to multiply of several times the temporal advantages 
mentioned above for a single instantiation of the abstract test-suite. If executed 
manually, this activity would require many hundreds of person-hours and is also 
subject to the risk of human errors (i.e. omission of a certain test condition), as 
witnessed by past experiences. 
                                                
7 Actually, the algorithm ensures the coverage of “at least” all the conditions provided in the 
railway condition table, but usually much more test conditions are generated. 
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A successful real application of this approach has been the IXL of the city of 
Manchester. This system controls a wide area around the city and needs a large 
configuration database (about 300 Megabytes), considering all the logic conditions 
required by the control tables. In order to manage such a complexity, a multistage 
installation was needed, starting from a basic configuration (including only routes of a 
certain area) and extending it step-by-step until the ultimate configuration (including 
more than 100 routes). In order to verify the system, about 1500 abstract tests have 
been defined and their instantiation produced more than 200,000 executable tests. 
Each stage of the installation involved several versions of the application software. 
Since the whole project was based on 5 stages, each one involving an average of 10 
software versions, the test activity would have been nearly unfeasible without the 
abstract testing approach presented in this paper.   
5. Conclusions 
This paper has presented an abstract testing methodology suitable for a class of 
control systems. The methodology allows for an automatic instantiation of functional 
tests in order to achieve an extensive configuration coverage in a reasonable time. The 
application of the approach to railway interlocking installations allowed test engineers 
to verify such systems in a both effective and efficient way: effectiveness consisted in 
a more extensive detection of configuration-related errors, while efficiency was 
represented by the significant gain in time and effort with respect to traditional 
approaches. The control systems of several large European railway stations are 
significant success stories for the approach. 
The abstract testing approach described in this paper could be applied to a range of 
critical applications in different fields, when the software architecture of the control 
systems fits or can be engineered/refactored to fit the reference models presented in 
this paper. Applications of interest include other types of railway and automotive 
control installations, including traffic management and brake-by-wire systems; 
supervisory control systems; flexible manufacturing installations; etc. The required 
customizations consist in implementing the abstract testing algorithm in a proper 
framework, allowing interfacing with the abstract testing representation formalism, 
configuration database and test scripting environments, according to the specific 
simulation languages. 
Future refinements of the methodology will focus on the development of a general 
model-based testing framework, supporting a stronger integration between the state-
based specification formalism, the configuration data and the simulation 
environments. At the state, in fact, the process could be significantly improved from 
the cohesion viewpoint: the available tools have been developed separately and their 
interaction must be often provided by hand, with an avoidable waste of time. The 
objective of generality also regards the standardization of the interfaces, with XML8-
                                                
8 The eXtended Markup Language (XML) is widely used as a versatile language for data 
representation and exchange [30]. 
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based representations possibly playing an important role. As an example, this would 
enable the possibility for a railway authority to apply the same test specification to 
different IXL suppliers, by asking them to develop interfaces (or adaptation layers) 
which are compliant to the defined standards (for both the representation of 
configuration data and the commands, stimuli and outputs of simulation 
environments). 
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VARIABLE BRIEF DESCRIPTION 
TC Test-case of the abstract test specification 
I_States Subset of input states defined by the abstract test 
Input_States Domain of possible input states for the system under test 
Si Condition used to extract a subset from the set of input states 
STATEi Generic input state amongst the ones defined by the abstract test 
Input_Sequence Sequence of inputs needed to reach a certain state 
Input_Sensors Subset of sensors involved in the abstract test 
Sensor_List 
Complete set of sensors available in the installation under test 
(configuration data) 
SEN Condition used to extract a subset from the set of sensors 
Sensor Generic sensor amongst the ones involved in the abstract test 
Input_TC 
Input of the test case, selected from the complete input domain (it 
specializes to each sensor to which it is applied) 
Input Complete input domain for the system under test 
I Condition used to extract a subset from the input domain 
INPUTj Generic input amongst the ones defined by the abstract test 
Output_Actuators Subset of actuators involved in the abstract test 
Actuator_List 
Complete set of actuators available in the installation under test 
(configuration data) 
ACT Condition used to extract a subset from the set of actuators 
Actuator Generic actuator amongst the ones involved in the abstract test 
O Output condition to be checked on actuators 
Attributes Set of attributes defining output state as defined in the abstract test 
STATEo 
Output state defined in the abstract test, intended in the algorithm as 
the subset of attributes to be checked 
Attrib Generic attribute whose value has to be checked for correctness 
S_Attrib 
Attribute of sensor processes which has the same name of the one to 
be checked 
Sen_LP 
Set of logic processes associated to sensors and containing at least 
one of the attributes to be checked 
Sensor_Association_List Set of logic processes associated to sensors 
A_Attrib 
Attribute of actuator processes which has the same name of the one 
to be checked 
Act_LP 
Set of logic processes associated to actuators and containing at least 
one of the attributes to be checked 
Actuator_Association_List Set of logic processes associated to actuators 
Logic_Processes 
Set of logic processes associated to sensors or actuators and 
containing at least one of the attributes to be checked 
Logic_Process 
Generic logic process associated to sensors or actuators and 
containing at least one of the attributes to be checked 
LP_Attrib 
Attribute of logic processes associated to sensors or actuators which 
has the same name of the one to be checked 
Proc_Attrib 
Complete set of system attributes having the same name of the one 
to be checked 
So Condition to be checked on attributes of system output state 
 
Table 1. Variables used in the abstract testing algorithm. 
